Category: Uncategorized

A Response to Moti Mirzahi

Have you ever wondered if we live in a simulation? For a while, simulation arguments were popular in philosophy. I hope to show why one of those arguments falls short. This argument is a different spin on an argument for God’s existence, from the universe appears designed, so there must be a very intelligent and powerful designer. These are called teleological arguments.

Moti Mizrahi stakes that the parts of this argument are better explained by the idea that we are in a simulation than if the universe were made by a designer. I’m not arguing that teleological arguments are successful or that the universe and its components need further explanation. I only hope to show that if you think the universe does need explanation, a designer is a better answer to the question than a simulation.

Mizrahi sets out four criteria to decide whether the simulation or God hypothesis is a better explanation of the universe. The criterion helps us form an uncertain hypothesis to the evidence we have. Mizrahi’s criterion is:

“Unification: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that explains the most and leaves the least unexplained things.

Coherence: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that is consistent with background knowledge.

Simplicity: As a general rule of thumb, choose the least complicated explanation, i.e., the one that posits the least causal sequences and entities, and that goes beyond the evidence the least.

Testability: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that yields independently testable predictions”[1]

Mizrahi makes three points on why a simulation theory provides greater unification:

(1) a simulation theory better explains quantum indeterminacy.

(2) A designer does not explain where the designer came from.

(3) Why did the designer want to have life in the universe after all?[2]

In turn, these questions can be flipped on the simulation hypothesis:

1. If there is a meaning to why quantum indeterminacy was programmed; why wouldn’t that explanation be unique explanation to a simulation hypothesis instead of a designer?
2. Where did the simulation come from? Under what conditions does it hold?
3. Again, why was the simulation made?

If fine-tuning needs explanation, it is not evident that these criteria actually favor a simulation hypothesis over a designer.

For coherence, Mizrahi says the simulation hypothesis represents what we know better, while we know little about theism.

However, the simulation hypothesis seems to open more doors than it closes. A designer raises a lot of questions. But we have ideas on how we might answer those questions. We do have methods that get us closer to what advanced simulations require, but those details raise many more questions than what a designer requires. As designers ourselves, we have a good grasp of what is required to design things.

For simplicity, Mizrahi states that a simulation is a simpler explanation as it does not introduce a new type of thing.[3]

But what simulated thing is equivalent to its real-life counterpart? A video game sword is completely different then a real. Mizrahi is mistaking the words we use for things to what things are. A designer introduces a new entity in need of explanation, but I don’t need to add non-simulated counterparts for everything that we know.

For testability, Mizrahi says the design hypothesis is untestable. But he does think the design hypothesis is testable via comparison of reality and the simulations we have. [4]

First, it seems odd that a super advanced simulation would be comparable to the simulations we have. Technology that has intricacies beyond my comprehension would be needed to simulate something of my consciousness, and I don’t think those simulations are comparable to ours.

Second, simulated items are not real items. So, simulated items require further explanation. Alternatively, you can just say that everyday items are real.

Admittedly, I don’t think comparison of similarities qualifies for testability. But if it does, his comparison of simulations breaking down to pixels supposes that the content of those pixels can recognize the pixels.[5] It would be odd if a simulated AI could observe the screen itself.

TLDR: Every question that is raised against God as an explanation to the design of the universe can be asked about the simulation hypothesis, which actually leaves us with more questions that need explaining.

Thanks for reading. Stay tuned to read about one of the biggest struggles for any fine-tuning argument.

---

[1] Mizrahi, Moti. “The Fine-Tuning argument and the simulation hypothesis.” Think, vol. 16, no. 46, 2017, pp. 93, https://doi.org/10.1017/s1477175617000094. (At 7 here: https://philarchive.org/archive/MIZTFA)

[2] Id. at 8.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 9.

A Preemptive Response to Nathan Rockwood.

A Mr. Beast video I recently watched has made me question a theodicy I previously thought was brilliant. Participants of Mr. Beast’s game shows voluntarily participate in contests that involve suffering. It ranges from social isolation to twisted social experiments and limited dietary constraints. Participants do not hold Mr. Beast accountable because they sign a waiver, but that doesn’t mean Mr. Beast’s actions are ok.

Nathan Rockwood is publishing a chapter in the upcoming Routledge publication, Contemporary Philosophy and the Latter-day Saint Tradition, titled Social Theodicy. He mentions it uses social contract theory, but again, contracts don’t make parties’ actions morally permissible.

But first, what is a theodicy anyway? A theodicy is an answer to the problem of evil.

So what is the problem of evil? The problem of evil has two major formulations: the logical problem of evil and the evidentiary problem of evil.

The Logical Problem of Evil:

The logical problem of evil’s formulation is popularly attributed to J. L. Mackie. It follows:

a) God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good.

b) Good beings prevent evil when they can.

c) There is evil that exists in the world.

d) God does not prevent all evil.

e) Therefore, God is either not all-powerful and cannot prevent all evil; is not all-knowing because there are evils he does not know about, so He cannot prevent; or is not all good because he does not prevent evils that He could prevent.

The Evidentiary Problem of Evil:

The evidentiary problem is not syllogistic. But rather, based on observation that there is pain, suffering, and things that may or may not be morally wrong in the absolute sense, but are unpleasant. Because of those circumstances, an all-good being would prevent or lower the amount of such pain, suffering, and wrong in the world.

It asks, does a deer in a forest fire need to be struck down in this world?

Leibniz’s Theodicy:

Leibniz (an inventor of calculus), who coined the term theodicy, proposed two theodicies. [1]

(1)Free will is necessary for moral goods.

(2) The world we live in is the best-possible-world God could have created.

These answers solve the logical problem by saying the world is necessary for how it is for moral goodness, and answer the evidentiary problem by invoking epistemic humility (admitting we don’t know the bigger picture), and there may be some reason for the suffering in a butterfly effect causal chain.

Rockwood proposes a Social Contract Theodicy:

“My proposal is similar. I argue that if you did or would rationally choose to live in a world like this one, then the conditions of the world, including the existence of evil, are justified by your own agreement to live in this world.”[2]

Latter-day Saints accept the premise that we chose to be in this world and were rational beings, then it is likely that we made a rational choice to be in this world. And so, as Rockwood provides, we are then justified by our agreement to live in a world with evil.

So, while our consent to live in a world may not make God responsible for evil happening to us, this does not explain why evil was necessary. This leaves the logical problem of evil unaddressed. Why did there need to be evil anyway? If evil could not have been prevented by God, He is not all-powerful. If there are evils that God did not know, then He is not all-knowing.[3]

We may have consented to experience evil because God is not all-powerful, or God did not completely know the volume of evil that would be experienced.

There is also an issue that God knew the pain, suffering, and evil that would follow from our consent. If the social contract theodicy is a rational choice that justifies evil, then we could not have known what the evil was like in any meaningful qualitative sense. We could study evil our whole life, but experiencing it is entirely different.

The gap of knowledge between God and us then needs to be explained by a leap of faith. We needed to trust that God is all-good if we wanted to endure evil. The same leap is needed when a practitioner questions “why me?” in the face of life’s troubles.

All these answers require a theodicy to explain why there is still evil in the face of an all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful God. The theodicy can be a free-will theodicy or a best-of-all-possible-worlds answer. A social contract theory then does not solve the logical problem of evil; it only pushes the explanation back. Moreso, the evidentiary problem of evil still stands. If rational beings consent to evil, that does not permit evil acts done against non-rational beings, such as the deer in the forest fire.

All of this to say, I am excited to see what Rockwood says. He is an incredible philosopher, having written on miracles, John Locke, free will, and foreknowledge, amongst many other things, and I imagine he has considered these problems. I recommend checking out his work, much of which is publicly available.[4] And expect me to provide a future update to what he actually says in his chapter in Contemporary Philosophy and the Latter-day Saint Tradition.

---

[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/

[2] https://www.facebook.com/SocietyChristianPhilosophers/posts/we-are-hosting-a-talk-this-friday-at-2pm-central-time-in-the-scps-work-in-progre/1059424039552290/

[3] This is a contested point in philosophy of time discussions on if future truthmakers are actualized (entities that correspond to truth) for statements about the future. If there is, then there can be true justified belief (knowledge) about future suffering. If not, there could be no knowledge. In this example, God would still have predictive power about evil because He is requiring us to consent, showing he acknowledges evil’s existence.

[4] https://philpeople.org/profiles/nathan-rockwood

In Tolstoy’s Confession, he makes two claims to why life is meaningless:

1. There is a seemingly uncloseable gap between the finite and its access to the infinite.
2. All acts in rational life lacks intrinsic meaning.

Assuming a strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) I respond to Tolstoy by providing a framework rather than complete demonstration of my metaphysical claims. The framework provides that rational agents engage with an underlying intelligible structure of reality, and that engagement provides meaning to emerge from the intelligible structure’s grounding. 

1. The Modal Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) for a Necessary Being:

Proof:

1. Every contingent fact or truth has a sufficient explanation.
2. The totality of contingent facts is contingent or dependent.
3. Therefore, the totality of contingent facts is contingent.
4. Therefore 3 needs an explanation that is not contingent. 
5. This means the explanation needs to be necessary.

Conclusion:

6. Therefore, there is a [Divine] Necessary Being (NB) that explains all of contingent reality (CR).

2. Divine Simplicity

The NB contradicts what it means to be a NB if it has parts or dependencies. If it has parts or dependencies then it could be otherwise. If it could be otherwise then it is contingent and not necessary.

Proof: 

1. If something has metaphysical parts or dependencies it is contingent.
2. The NB is not contingent.

Conclusion:

3. Therefore, the NB is not made of parts or dependencies and all attributes are identical.

3. Intelligibility

Commentary: This principle is elaborate. But will be shown as necessary. 

Proof:

1. Intelligibility is a mind-independent but mind-accessible structure of the explanatory relations between facts or states of affairs.
2. Reasoning requires intelligibility.
3. Denying intelligibility is reasoning.
4. Therefore, intelligibility is required for all rational activity.
5. Whatever is necessary for all rational activity requires explanation (PSR).

Conclusion:

6. Therefore, intelligibility requires a necessary explanation or necessary being (NB).

4. Grounding Intelligibility

Proof: 

1. If intelligibility is required for reasoning, then explanatory relations must exist in reality, not merely cognition.
2. All explanation presupposes intelligibility.
3. Explanatory relations are not reducible to particular facts but the facts’ dependent structure between them.
4. PSR applies to explanatory relations in it of itself not only particular facts.
5. Therefore, intelligibility requires the PSR.

Conclusion:

6. Therefore, intelligibility is explained by the NB and is a property of the NB.

5. Actuality and Potentiality of Finite Reality 

Proof: 

1. Finite beings exist in with a state (actuality) and possess the ability to realize capacities for further particular states (potentiality).
2. Ordinary physical explanations (e.g. objects’ capacities to reflect light) presupposes actualized structured capacities under conditions.
3. Instantiations of those states in all finite things independent of particulars require grounding. (Per PSR)
4. All grounding is terminal in the NB. (I(5)).

Conclusion:

5. All actuality and potentiality of finite things is grounded in the NB.

6. Necessary Being as explanation

Any actualization of the NB must originate from a property of the NB.

Proof:

1. The NB is defined by its properties.
2. The NB’s properties are all identical. (II(3))
3. The NB ‘s explanatory power is identical to its nature. (II(3)
4. The NB explains everything in CR. (I(5))

Conclusion:

5. Therefore, NB’s properties explain all of CR.

7. Intelligible Agents

Proof: 

1. Humans rationalize.
2. Humans are finite.
3. All expressions of rationality require intelligibility.
4. Humans require intelligibility. (1 & 2)
5. All instantiations of intelligibly inside CR is grounded in the NB.

Conclusions:

6. Therefor human rationalization is a finite manifestation of the NB. 

8. Participation in Divine Causality

Proof: 

1. Rationalizing agents necessarily engage in reasoning.
2. Reasoning presupposes intelligibility.
3. Intelligibility is grounded in the NB. (III(6))

Conclusion:

4. Therefore, rational agents participate necessarily in a structure grounded by the NB.

9. Coherent Actualization and Normative Extension of Established Framework

1. Intelligibility is mind-independent structured explanatory relations grounded in the NB (IV(5)).
2. Rational agents necessarily participate in intelligibility through reasoning.  (VIII(4)).
3. Rational agent reasoning necessarily entails coherence of intelligibility because reasoning is non-arbitrary structured relations between reasons, judgements, and outcomes.
4. If normativity exists (non-arbitrary reasons for action) it presupposes structured explanatory relations.
5. Normativity presupposing structured explanatory relations required grounding in intelligibility.
6. Rational evaluation presupposes coherence and non-arbitrariness within intelligibility.
7. Rational agent participation in intelligibility is not limited to reasoning but actualization of potentialities that extend explanatory relations inside intelligibility’s structure.
8. Not all actualizations support intelligibilities coherence.
9. Rationalization presupposes coherence within intelligibility.

Intermediate Conclusion:

10. Therefore, rational agents have reason to distinguish forms of actualization that enhance or undermine intelligibility.

Proof Continued:

11. Universal rational participation in intelligibility serves as actualization of intelligibility’s coherence.
12. Any act of rational evaluation commits agents to preserving and extending the coherent intelligible structure that makes evaluation possible.

Conclusion:

13. Therefore, rational agents have reason to pursue forms of actualization that increase coherent intelligible structures and avoid forms that undermine it.

10. The Ethic: Divine Participation in Actuality and Potentiality

Proof:

1. Rational agents have reason to pursue coherent intelligible actualization. (IX(10)).
2. Finite beings possess multiple instantiations of varying capacities of actuality and potentiality. (V(1))
3. Realization of capacities result in forms of actualization within intelligible structure.
4. Distinct rational agent activities are different modes of actualization. (Knowledge, relationships, physical fitness, ect.)
5. Forms of actualization that enhance intelligibility across rational agent modes of actualization increases participation (as actualization and potentiality) in intelligibility.
6. Forms of actualization can limit further participation in intelligibility. 

Conclusion:

7. Therefore, rational agent ought to pursue actualization of potentialities that enhance intelligibility coherence across modes (human flourishing) in their participation inside intelligible structure.

11. Answering Tolstoy:

1. Evaluating if life is meaningful presupposes rational activity and intelligibility.
2. Rational activity and use of intelligibility require the intelligible structure grounded in the NB.
3. Rejecting participation/negating rational agency removes the premises to permit the question.

Conclusion: 

4. Therefore, denying meaning undermines its own necessary conditions.

Final Conclusion

Reality is unified necessary actuality that grounds existence and intelligibility that provides meaning from rational participation within.