Why We Are Not In a Simulation

A Response to Moti Mirzahi

Have you ever wondered if we live in a simulation? For a while, simulation arguments were popular in philosophy. I hope to show why one of those arguments falls short. This argument is a different spin on an argument for God’s existence, from the universe appears designed, so there must be a very intelligent and powerful designer. These are called teleological arguments.

Moti Mizrahi stakes that the parts of this argument are better explained by the idea that we are in a simulation than if the universe were made by a designer. I’m not arguing that teleological arguments are successful or that the universe and its components need further explanation. I only hope to show that if you think the universe does need explanation, a designer is a better answer to the question than a simulation.

Mizrahi sets out four criteria to decide whether the simulation or God hypothesis is a better explanation of the universe. The criterion helps us form an uncertain hypothesis to the evidence we have. Mizrahi’s criterion is:

Unification: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that explains the most and leaves the least unexplained things.

Coherence: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that is consistent with background knowledge.

Simplicity: As a general rule of thumb, choose the least complicated explanation, i.e., the one that posits the least causal sequences and entities, and that goes beyond the evidence the least.

Testability: As a general rule of thumb, choose the explanation that yields independently testable predictions”[1]

Mizrahi makes three points on why a simulation theory provides greater unification:

(1) a simulation theory better explains quantum indeterminacy.

(2) A designer does not explain where the designer came from.

(3) Why did the designer want to have life in the universe after all?[2]

In turn, these questions can be flipped on the simulation hypothesis:

  1. If there is a meaning to why quantum indeterminacy was programmed; why wouldn’t that explanation be unique explanation to a simulation hypothesis instead of a designer?
  2. Where did the simulation come from? Under what conditions does it hold?
  3. Again, why was the simulation made?

If fine-tuning needs explanation, it is not evident that these criteria actually favor a simulation hypothesis over a designer.

For coherence, Mizrahi says the simulation hypothesis represents what we know better, while we know little about theism.

However, the simulation hypothesis seems to open more doors than it closes. A designer raises a lot of questions. But we have ideas on how we might answer those questions. We do have methods that get us closer to what advanced simulations require, but those details raise many more questions than what a designer requires. As designers ourselves, we have a good grasp of what is required to design things.

For simplicity, Mizrahi states that a simulation is a simpler explanation as it does not introduce a new type of thing.[3]

But what simulated thing is equivalent to its real-life counterpart? A video game sword is completely different then a real. Mizrahi is mistaking the words we use for things to what things are. A designer introduces a new entity in need of explanation, but I don’t need to add non-simulated counterparts for everything that we know.

For testability, Mizrahi says the design hypothesis is untestable. But he does think the design hypothesis is testable via comparison of reality and the simulations we have. [4]

First, it seems odd that a super advanced simulation would be comparable to the simulations we have. Technology that has intricacies beyond my comprehension would be needed to simulate something of my consciousness, and I don’t think those simulations are comparable to ours.

Second, simulated items are not real items. So, simulated items require further explanation. Alternatively, you can just say that everyday items are real.

Admittedly, I don’t think comparison of similarities qualifies for testability. But if it does, his comparison of simulations breaking down to pixels supposes that the content of those pixels can recognize the pixels.[5] It would be odd if a simulated AI could observe the screen itself.

TLDR: Every question that is raised against God as an explanation to the design of the universe can be asked about the simulation hypothesis, which actually leaves us with more questions that need explaining.

Thanks for reading. Stay tuned to read about one of the biggest struggles for any fine-tuning argument.


[1] Mizrahi, Moti. “The Fine-Tuning argument and the simulation hypothesis.” Think, vol. 16, no. 46, 2017, pp. 93, https://doi.org/10.1017/s1477175617000094. (At 7 here: https://philarchive.org/archive/MIZTFA)

[2] Id. at 8.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id. at 9.